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Abstract

Memory, viewed as a power of the soul, is regarded as a temporary mechanism of perception by St. Augustine. Although, we will not refer to this concept in relation to God—as mentioned in the tenth book of Confessions—, we will rely on it to analyze memory’s displacements and shortcuts which allow us to create a vision of the world and build identity routes as subjects in the everyday evolution. From this platform of perception onwards, we will analyze memory mechanisms shared between life and art that are used in reconstructing the aesthetic object. We will start by reviewing St. Augustine’s memory concept; then going over Paul Ricoeur’s practical experience mentioned in Time and Narration; and closing by examining the aesthetic object ideas developed by Roman Ingarden.
Keywords: Memory, St. Augustine, Paul Ricoeur, Roman Ingarden.

1. Memory

Recording things and events, and bringing them to the present conscience to put them as before a mirror seems a metaphorical action in the light of the Aristotelian theory. But that is exactly what memory does. It not only allows marking the intentional direction of memories from the past into the future as a catalyst, but also shortens temporary distances, and establishes the reliefs of the perception of objects. In fact, we simultaneously confront the current perception of an object with any other perceptual past stages of the same object. From a phenomenological perspective, memory acts by relegating some aspects and highlighting others when confronting the same perceived fact.

Memory is thus the gear box that, according to medieval philosophy, was somehow affected by things that came from the body and that troubled the soul. Therefore, a purgative through mortification of the body and self-inflicted pain was needed to obliterate passions and desire. In this way, memory was freed from carnal attachments, and the soul was directed towards God. By putting the soul in a State of hope, abstinence was undoubtedly observed, so to speak, the perception of the future as bliss.

Memory, which according to St. Augustine is one of the powers of the soul that must be conquered to get to God, stands above of all the sensitive and is the broad field where the treasure of countless images of all the objects that are in any way sensitive is stored, which passed to the deposit by the strain of the senses. In addition to these images, all thoughts, speeches and reflections we make are...
stored there, now increasing, or declining, or varying those same things that were the object of our senses (2002, p. 106).

The soul avails itself of the memory and memory shows it the saved images. But Augustine recognizes that not all images that the memory shows are on the surface. Memory is complicated, cavernous, and therefore not all called or invoked images come as easily when summoned. Some sprout immediately, “but others you have to look for them more slowly, as if it were necessary to take them out of a distant and hidden bosom” (p. 106). It is thus not a simple mechanism consisting of evoking them so that the images appear. It happens, for example, that when we need the most to retrieve a name or a date, it always comes to our mind other data, information that we do not want. Some images of memory come piled up in droves, explains Augustine, even though we do not call them. Sometimes we want to put them aside to find what we seek, until those that we want show themselves coming out of the cavernous bosom in which they were hidden.

But so wonderful is the memory that keeps order and distinction of the things that come through the senses:

Depending upon the organ or duct from where each one of them came in, as, for example, light and all colors, figure and beauty of the bodies, by the eyes; all the genera and species that there are sounds and voices, by the ears; all smells, by the organ of smell; all the flavors, by the taste; and finally, by the sense of touch, which usually extends throughout the body, all the species that are hard or soft, hot or cold, soft or harsh, heavy or light, whether these things are foreign, or already inside the body. This utmost capacity toilet of memory receives, in I don't know what secret and
unexplained bosoms, all these things that enter from the different gates of the senses into the memory, and are deposited and stored, so that they can be discovered and presented again whenever necessary (p. 207).

In memory, it is clear that we do not find the material things, but the sensitive images that appear in our thinking when they are convened. But we see them not as images, but in the “as if” things. According to Augustine, we cannot know how they were formed, but we do know that they were attracted and are kept inside. “Because even though I am in the dark and silent, if I want, I get various colors in my memory, and I do distinguish between white and black, and other colors I want; and noises or sounds are not present then, they do not disrupt what I am considering, and which had entered by the eyes” (p. 207). And so, with the ability to differentiate the things stored in the memory, I distinguish each other according to their nature. I don't need go further back to my senses to remember the fruit sweetness or the blue color of the sky. I do everything, as mentioned by Augustine, within my memory. In that large room I find everything that I have been able to perceive and I find myself; “I remember me and of what I did, and at what time, and in what place I did it, and in which disposition and circumstances I was when I did it. There are all the things that I remember, either which I learned from my own experience, or that I believed by foreign account” (p. 208). In addition to what I have experienced, others things come out from my memory, things I imagine in the future. I can say that I narrate my future, my hopes, my dreams, as Augustine says, this memory capacity comes from the soul, from the nature of being, and it accommodates everything in it, then how could the soul understand everything else and not understand itself?
Normally, we are amazed by things outside of us. Things captured by our memory; however, we seldom reflect on ourselves, on the wonderful appearance of the pictures in our memory when we name what we remember. We are not aware of what is involved in recalling things. Our memory fits all our perceptions, the knowledge we have of the sciences and the arts, and the perception and knowledge that we have of ourselves.

Knowledge of Arts and Sciences dwells in a deeper place of the memory, claims Augustine. Here it is worth to differentiate between rhetoric knowledge and ontologically autonomous things we perceive. “Because what I know about grammar, logic and rhetoric is not thereby in my memory that within it are the images of the sciences, and these stay out” (p. 209). Sciences do not enter into the memory by the ministry of the senses, as the image of a swimming pool or a person falling in the middle of the street enters in it. It is not in the same way in my memory what I know about the metaphor or the world depicted in a poem. However, when we “learn” something about poetics, grammar, logic or mathematics, then we can recognize it as truth: “two plus two is four”, for example. Something different happens with the assimilation of concepts as knowledge rather than as “sensitive” things. When we understand the metaphor put things before our eyes, as Aristotle asserted, we notice the revelation of a world, as it can occur in the reading of the poem “Elegy” of José Gorostiza: “Sometimes I feel like crying, / but the sea supplies this feeling” (2011), or when we learn how to read, a moment when the knowledge and the sensitive apprehension of the world merge. It is common to hear adults saying: “when I learned to read, it was as if they had taken away a blindfold”. Although it is not with the eyes that we understand that expression; understanding did not enter by any of the senses, St. Augustine would say, because it is like a thought that is organized at the time of reading. In this sense, Ingarden speaks about the acts of conscience and the intentional correlates to concretize the work.
But perhaps with the above examples we can yet be confused. There would be those who argue the phonic and visual aspects involving the reading of the poem or the subject of the knowledge of the arts and the role played by the senses. However, if we return to the example of the addition, we see that two plus two is four, and we recognize it as truth; we are glad of it. But if we had not learned to add, perhaps this truth would remain hidden, and would have never been thought, claims Augustine. Thus, these images that involve knowledge, do not enter through the senses, but they were scattered in our memory and are “collected” in our mind, “kept-ready”, –to use an ingardenian expression– in such a way that after our “learning” is done, it will be easy for us to retrieve them as practical experience, and in the concretization of the text that we were facing.

As a result of the above, it is important to emphasize that for Augustine the memory is a fundamental mechanism of thought and knowledge that consists of ordering scattered memories. In this sense, it is valid to say that the memory causes the reflective act which exercises the thinking. But also in the memory there are, says Augustine, disorders of the mood, the passions of the soul; however, they are not found “in the same way like when the soul actually feels them, since without feeling joy, I remember having been cheerful, and without being sad, I remember the last sadness” (p. 212). The memory is to the soul what the mouth to the body and “joy and sadness are two dishes, one sweet and one bitter; and, when those are entrusted to memory, so as delicacies go to the stomach, which can there be saved, but cannot communicate its flavor” (p. 212).

In the memory, we find the most significant voices of the passions and notions that form them. In this sense, we could say that the memory, in the Augustinian sense, allows us to experience things, situations that we have never experienced while reading a work of literary art. This record of the passions in the memory appears here as the seed of the
vicarious experiences, because somehow we get the notions of pain, joy, hate, sadness, loneliness, without all these passions having necessarily entered the body. Somehow, however, asserts Augustine, they entered into the memory and “feeling the soul and experiencing its own passions, it entrusted to memory these ideas; either she herself, without they were being handed, had them collected for herself” (p. 2013).

Even the oblivion comes into our memory. Many times we remember when we forgot about such or that thing. Is true that we remember not oblivion itself, but the image that represents it, asserts Augustine. Oblivion also outlines things. When we don't remember where we left some object, for example, we seek in our memory and when we finally find it we exclaim: “Here it is”! And we confirm that we got that thing. This finding occurs because in our memory we bind the thing in our memory with the real thing we find in the space where we left it; when we do not bind the memoir and the real object, the memory is truncated and we do not find things. The same happens when we do not remember the name of a person because in our memory, we do not link her name with her face, states St. Augustine.

All of this happens in the memory: Recording of things, of knowledge, of passions, of oblivion; but self-knowledge, how is it recorded in our memory? Is it a sensory level we know? Is the memory level of our stories the same as that of the perceived ontologically autonomous things or that of the knowledge or even the one of our passions? There is no doubt that the memory acts as one of the fundamental mechanisms in the perception that we have of ourselves; However, his most notable action is directed towards the resolution of everyday life; the thoughtfulness of the memory, to what we are, is almost always relegated to the past, as a reminder of the circumstances which indicate or change the course of our life. But the memory is a mechanism that not only anchors in the past, but
it also includes the complex of temporality as Augustine states it: the present of the present, the present of the past and present of the future.

As present, the memory is flow of perception; from the phenomenological perspective, we could point out the movement of memory throughout images that come from the senses, and see how the time in which the memory “sorts” what is perceived is not flat or happens, so to speak, once. But we will develop this temporal conception of memory in another article, now we only want to point out that temporal memory ripples happen; and they happen as past, as present and as future. Maybe it is easier to talk about the past as memoir, as a souvenir. However, it is possible inquiring about “being beings of memory”. We can even see that while memory implies an order, an organization of thought, it can foresee for events or future situations. Memory, in this sense, has a mechanism of protention not only in the different phases of the present (now), but in the displacement from the present to the future. It follows, so to speak, the direction that marks the intentionality, the order that sets this directionality in everyday narrative.

2. Practical experience as narrative experience

When we talk about the memory’s mechanisms in relation to the art and the life, we undoubtedly have to stop and ask ourselves if the memory works in the same way when we experience the events of everyday life, and when we experience a work of literary art. In first instance, we could say that there is no difference, and that the mechanisms of memory occur in one or the other since the undulations, as we have seen in the previous section, occur in both the work of art and the everyday perception of the world, or, in terms of Paul Ricoeur: they occur in the practical experience. There, memory modulates our vision of the world in a sort of centripetal movement which departs from the Augustinian view. But the
fact is that memory not only acts as a mechanism that records whatever “enters” into it; but rather, in a centrifugal ripple, it outlines the thought that becomes discourse. So, we live by living through the narrative that surrounds us. In each fact, each step, we build pieces of a discourse that seems endless throughout our lives. We link what we see with what we remember, what we dream, what we imagine or even what we forgot, but we go back to reconfigure it from another perspective onwards. The intricacies of memory—as we agree with Augustine’s—, lead us to apprehend the world in a way much more complicated than just grabbing images and pile them in the recipient, to the extent of the past.

On the other hand, beyond understanding the world based upon the memory, the perceptual subject needs to understand himself; and getting out of himself, see his shadow—like the entretemps (“between times”) of Levinas — while trying to recognize himself, the human being undoubtedly resorts to the distance of the discourse. In other words, he knows himself through the language, as an explanatory narrative. So is the word mediator of self-knowledge? If as Paul Ricoeur asserts, the narrative is what solves the aporia of time, then it is the language which allows the subject to construct himself. The word takes us out of our own axis allowing us to see ourselves as others, as being different from ourselves. The perceptual subject builds networks that reconfigure him in the discourse. In this way, based on the mechanisms of memory, the practical understanding becomes also narrative understanding. Then, in addition to what has been experienced, things that we imagine in the future come out from the memory too. I can say that I narrated my future, my hopes, my dreams, because, as we noted above, memory stores temporal aspects that travel through retention and protention movements, and these aspects function as identity anchor for the subject in the daily narrative “self-figuration”. And although, memory in everyday life does not operate like the conformation of the discourse in the artistic text, we
can assert that this substrate of narrative structure that becomes a memory is home to the mythical and archetypal traits that give rise to art. In these formulas that are generated as simple forms, according to André Jolles, the reefs of discursive strategies that every great artist uses can be foreseen. Here something decisive happens to the subject: he constructs himself by using the language that binds into the mechanisms of memory to “go saying”, “go seeing” in the mirror of the other who senses himself in the mirror of the language. Because, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, “imitate or represent the action is, firstly, to understand previously what human action is: its semantic, its symbolic reality, its temporality. On top of this pre-comprehension, common to the poet and his reader, construction of the plot and, with it, the textual and literary mimetic rises” (p. 129).

If we return to the initial question in this section, we can say in principle that memory works in the concretization of the work of art in a similar way as it happens in practical experience; It has its foundation in the relationship that exists between the practical understanding and narrative comprehension or practical intelligence and narrative intelligence, as it is also named by Ricoeur. There is a double transformation of the memory in these processes that here we can differentiate as practical experience and aesthetic experience. Before we fully examine the latter, we must consider other aspects.

Memory organizes the semantic, symbolic and temporary features arising between human doing and the narrative of practical experience. Let's say the daily narrative is mounted on the human act. The farmer, who narrates the loss of his crop, builds his story from those traits (semantic, symbolic and temporary). Using his practical intelligence and his narrative competence, he confronts us with their peculiar conversation. However, if we consider more structured discourses than the one of the everyday, it will certainly complicate the operation of memory which contemplates the transformation of practical
understanding into narrative comprehension and this one into scientific or aesthetic understanding as the case may be. Now it is not our interest to address the understanding of the scientific text, so is that we will only examine art.

The artistic text, in this sense, presents only fragments of the world that we can recognize; for this reason, Roman Ingarden explains that the reader or listener performs more complicated acts of comprehension in order to reconstruct the set of circumstances in the intentional co-relation of the language. Thus, thanks to the imaginational activity caused by the work of art, in the reader’s memory, movements of images, passions and things are generated. Those that were hidden, so to speak, due to the poetic discourse structure, in the artistic, ambiguous and multiple-meaning work, are traits, qualities that are “kept-ready” to go afloat and “settle” into the course of thinking that becomes concretization attitude. Thus it occurs in the understanding of the artistic text, a correlative operation, where memory also has images that come to the mind as soon as they are called. However, this call does not come out from the subject that is named from the human doing or from practical experience, but from other hidden cavernous cells of poetic ambiguity that require a more developed literary competence. This fact undoubtedly has an impact on the construction of the aesthetic object we do from experiencing the work of art and requires unique memory operations that develop within the reading competence. Now we can ask ourselves why we do not understand in the same way or with the same temporary undulations a daily conversation about the weather, religion or even the current policy and a poem.

3. The reconstruction of the aesthetic object

The conformation of the aesthetic object confront us with these memory undulations — those that come from the world of the work of art creating the imagery of characters,
situations, time, space, to the reader’s experience rooted in the practical comprehension and the narrative understanding—to dialogue with that that the work provoked. This occurs without us realizing that, as Augustine states, we are actually arranging memory fragments of thought, while “stirring” images that were, so to speak, sleeping or hidden in some cavernous memory layer. Wolfgang Iser speaks of sediments that eventually go up, so to speak, to the surface, when the reader concretizes the text and an indeterminate world appears before him. Therefore, we can say that the memory works in the same way in the reading of a work of art and in the practical world competence. What we see before a literary text are spots of black ink on paper and what enters to our consciousness (soul) are not images of words, but the objects represented by them through cognitive operations we perform. There are special features of poetic language that Ingarden recognizes as artistic values that cause, so to speak, “kept-ready” qualities which activate deep memory mechanisms. Although not everything in an artistic text can be “special”. In order to highlight some items, there must be others that serve only as a support. In fact, words or letters do not shine alone, but in the context of the intentional correlative, where they acquire meaning through concretion. Ingarden explains that “[w]hile reading a printed text, individual letters and verbal signs do not have individual qualities for us, or we simply do not care about them. If it wasn't that way, carefully noticing all the individual differences between the letters would hinder our reading process” (2005, p. 36). And in fact, if this thorough Reading happens on a poem, like Vicente Huidobro’s “Altazor”, we are unable to follow the verbal game of the windmill, for example:

Jugamos fuera del tiempo

Y juega con nosotros el molino de viento Molino de viento
Molino de aliento
Molino de cuento
Molino de intento
Molino de aumento
Molino de ungüento
Molino de sustento
Molino de tormento
Molino de salvamento
Molino de advenimiento
Molino de tejimiento

Although we enjoy the poem’s ludic perspective, we must return to the intentional direction words acquired in the piece, or risk staying within the “gratuity” of these elements. It is even possible to lose sight of the artistic value too, if we read this fragment as something separate from the full intent of the poem. Another example of this kind is found in “Nocturno en que nada se oye” (Nocturne in which Nothing is Heard) of Xavier Villaurrutia:

cae mi voz
y mi voz que madura
y mi voz quemadura

1 We play out of time / And the windmill plays us / Windmill of wind / Windmill of breath / Windmill of tale / Windmill of attempt / Windmill of rise / Windmill of salve / Windmill of sustain / Windmill of torment / Windmill of salvage / Windmill of advent / Windmill of weave.
In the two previous cases, memory articulates the perception of the word game in connection with the whole poem. Let's say that here the memory makes us see how to bind, so to speak, each of the verses in order to conform the aesthetic object as a whole. We note qualities of value derived from the stratum of the phonic material to establish the game sense in the total context of the poem. When we finished reading these word games, we have to return to the given images and tack what we actually perceive with the images that sprout after. The same happens when we listen to songs. When we hear the last note, we still retain the first one. But where do we keep it? How do we do that? Here we must turn to Roman Ingarden’s theory which states that certain qualities of the works are always “kept-ready”. However, we remember these notes thanks in part to other elements also “kept-ready” that have to do with our background: culture, values, knowledge, scientific, artistic, etc., i.e. practical experience that allows memory to bring or activate certain details which we confront against each other in the text concretization.

It is clear therefore, that at the time of reading, memory, and what is the same, the reader’s soul intervene –Saint Augustine would say–, and that intervention is regulated by other mechanisms that emerge of what is represented. Memory relies on past, a practical competence to anchor itself in the present text and to provide for a future in the exercise of protention and retention that the reading temporality manifests. The reader, so to speak, brings his life expertise to enter the world of the text and interpret it, but at the same time, the text gives him a new knowledge of the world, vicarious experiences. This reading, as

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2 Xavier Villaurrutia, *Nostalgia de la muerte*. Falls my voice / And my voice that ripens / And my voice that is burned / And my forest matures / And my voice burns hard.
Gadamer claims “when the language is explicitly as such, appears as the primary mediation to gain access to the world” (p. 198). Unlike artistic texts, whereas art conveys a secondary mediation or second degree reference to the reality, as Ricoeur recognizes it, due to the metaphorical nature of language in those texts. In this mediation we must consider at least 3 things: the utterance quasi-judgmental character and the world we perceive; the aesthetic experience; and the artistic and aesthetic values that influence the formation of the aesthetic object and in the self-construction of the subject.

Unlike the scientific text, the content of the aesthetic images is quasi-judgmental. I.e., the world that appears before the subject is an intentional one that does not have the pretension of the truth in the practical sense of the world. Roman Ingarden says that its “function is to present a mere aspect of the reality of the objects represented without coining them as true realities. Even the utterances of other types, for example the interrogative ones, suffer a modification of its corresponding function in the literary work” (1998, p. 23). This quasi-judgmental character gives to represented things a reality *habitus*. However, we only have a few aspects of what has been named. Those are schemata, patterns of a reality that we rebuild using aspects that have been scattered through the literary work. Indeed, the same work, says Ingarden, prepares, so to speak, the reader, to rebuild this world in the aesthetic object. Of course what we have between the represented world and our reality is the temporal distance from the language, but with the proximity of the aesthetic experience, the world is revealed as immanent, as one now in our consciousness. Thus, the reader lives the circumstances as if they actually happen. In this sense we can say that memory performs a similar activity to what is happening in the practical understanding and in the narrative understanding of the world. This fact makes us “live” the world of work on the verbal distance; it is of course related to the communicative
aspect of the text which Hans Robert Jauss called catharsis when he speaks of the triad: poiesis, aisthesis, and cataharsis. I.e., the reader lives the world built on the vicarious experience of the characters. He learns with them, gains access to this world from its own represented world. And here, we must say so, not only the reader activates hidden aspects of his practical experience in his memory, but memory creates new mechanisms from “provoked” imagination to help him to sort the thoughts of the characters, the narrator or the lyrical subject. Ingarden claims that thanks to the action memory performs, which becomes narrative understanding and practical experience, the subject recognizes, completes, and concretizes a world. The reader enters to the world of the text and builds the aesthetic object as a framework relying on the text itself and his own competence, assures Ingarden.

The work of literary art itself is a purely intentional structure. It has its origin in the creative acts of the consciousness of the author, and physical basis in the text, set by writing or other means of reproduction, for example a tape recorder. By virtue of the dual layer of language (Phonics matter and sense) the work is, therefore, intersubjective accessible and reproducible, so [that] becomes an intersubjective intentional object, related to a community of readers. As such, it is not a psychological phenomenon and is transcendent to all experiences of consciousness, both the author and the reader (1998, p. 23).

Another fundamental aspect to the construction of the aesthetic object in the work of art is the artistic and aesthetic values. Here we could say that all kinds of values that come into the work determine the configuration of the aesthetic object insofar as they represent the
work of art anchoring in the world of the reader. Through these values, the subject is reconfigured. But the artistic and aesthetic values are what shape that world as analog of art. The naive reader may never realize that artistic and aesthetic values are those who “push” the world of work to bring “it” before his eyes, since memory run the transition from life to art only in the scope of the experience, but not as knowledge awareness. I.e., the artistic and aesthetic values make their work which is to cause that world’s qualities appear; but, it is not but the aesthete reader, literary critic or scholar of art, who is aware of how they work. Here is where the literary competition plays a key role. With this aesthetic attitude we noticed that:

If the literary work is a masterpiece of special value, each of its strata contains valuable qualities of two types: the artistic value and aesthetic value; These values are present in the work of art in a peculiarly potential State; and in their total multiplicity lead to the polyphony of the aesthetic qualities of particular value, that determine the aesthetic value of the work (p.22).

In fact, asserts the Polish philosopher: “even in the scientific writing, it often appears the literary qualities which determine certain aesthetically valuable characteristics, although in that case, they may only function as ornamentation” (p. 22). But these qualities of value are those that cause the refiguration of the world. So happens that the work is a hinge between the intentional world embodied by the author and the world materialized by the reader in the aesthetic object. The artistic value, says Ingarden, is a means to provoke the aesthetic values that have to do as stated by Iser, with the pole of the reader. The artistic value “is an expressly relational value, whose nature as a value lies in the fact that it is a necessary
means to the attainment of something that possess value in and by itself” (Ingarden, 2005, p. 346) It may be possible that in poems such as El sueño (The Dream) of Sor Juana, some literary strategies appear evidently, but the reader is still unable to gain access to the work’s represented world, and therefore, cannot build in his mind a proper aesthetic object.

Piramidal, funesta, de la tierra
nacida sombra, al Cielo encaminaba
de vanos obeliscos punta altiva,
escalar pretendiendo las Estrellas;
si bien sus luces bellas
—exentas siempre, siempre rutilantes—
la tenebrosa guerra
que con negros vapores le intimaba
la pavorosa sombra fugitiva
burlaban tan distantes,
que su atezado ceño
al superior convexo aun no llegaba
del orbe de la Diosa
que tres veces hermosa
con tres hermosos rostros ser ostenta,
quedando sólo o dueño
del aire que empañaba
con el aliento denso que exhalaba;
y en la quietud contenta
de imperio silencioso,
sumisas sólo voces consentía
de las nocturnas aves,
tan obscuras, tan graves,
que aun el silencio no se interrumpía³.

Here, the work of art, as Ingarden states, has a “build-up of qualities” (2005, p. 347) that form the ontic basis required to achieve its concretization. However, the reader may not possess the necessary competence to attain such construction of the aesthetic object, and the conformation of the aesthetic object must not be solely product of the reader’s imaginative acts. Although its ontic sphere depends on the reader’s concretization, the aesthetic object should be linked in some way to the work’s textuality. To illustrate this case, we could use the image that Alfonso Reyes used when talking about literature. The aesthetic object might look like that comet simultaneously tethered to the mountain and to the sky, but what is given, and what is not, both merge in the synthetic fight of the aesthetic object conformation. (Vergara, 2009). “The work must get opalescent, so to speak, in this ambiguity and, thus, achieving their particular artistic effects. The reader, too, with the help of the work’s reflective knowledge, has to learn about this property, and apprehend it as a feature of the work” (Ingarden, 2005, p. 441).

³ Sor Juana, Primero sueño.
Pyramidal, ill-fated, from the ground / Born a shadow, walking towards the Sky / From vain obelisks arrogantly pointed, / Pretending to climb to the stars; / Even though with beautiful lights / −always free, always shining− / The sinister war / That with dark flames intimidated / The terrifying fugitive shadow / Juked so distant / That its dark skin forehead / To the high convex did not yet arrive / From the world of the Goddess / That is three times beautiful / With three beautiful faces boastingly is, / Staying alone or owning / The air that blurred / With exhaled heavy breath; / And in the joyful quietness / Of the quiet empire, / Only consented servile voices / From the night birds, / So dark, so terrible / That even the silence / Would not dare to interrupt.
Finally, we can say that before the work of art the subject self-constructs himself thanks to the aesthetic object, as in this idea of world for which the same work prepares him, the memory conveys the practical understanding of the world to the aesthetic understanding. It takes from real world what it needs, and brings it into the aesthetic memory, and thereupon the experience of the work, returns to the world that acts as a mirror where the subject recognizes himself "in another way". In this sense, we could say that an apparent oblivion happens in this recognition of the subject as another. Therefore, where does it lie what I was before reading? However, what do happen here is that propped up the memory in the world of art, it broadens the horizon and integrates images of a still unimagined world to the memory which stores those images of the world the subject inhabits.

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